Beyond Netanyahu: What Israel’s Election Reveals About Its Political Future

As Israelis head toward a political deadlock, the election raises a question for Washington: Is opposition to Netanyahu enough when so many of the policies affecting Palestinians extend far beyond his government?

For years, American politicians have drawn a distinction between Benjamin Netanyahu and Israel itself. They condemn the prime minister, criticize his far-right coalition, and express frustration with his handling of Gaza and the occupied West Bank, all while reaffirming their support for Israel and its military.

The implication is familiar: Netanyahu is the problem. Remove him, and a different Israel might emerge.

But Israel’s October 27 election demands a closer examination of that assumption.

After years of war in Gaza, mass Palestinian displacement, expanding settlements, and growing international condemnation, Israelis returned to the polls to determine their country’s political future. With votes still being counted, neither Netanyahu nor his principal challenger, former military chief Gadi Eisenkot, has secured a parliamentary majority.

Yet the election is revealing for reasons that go beyond who ultimately forms the next government.

The leading Jewish Israeli opposition candidates have embraced continued Israeli security control over Palestinian territory, rejected or deferred Palestinian statehood, and supported military operations beyond Israel’s borders. Meanwhile, public-opinion surveys reveal widespread skepticism toward Palestinian independence and troubling attitudes toward the humanitarian crisis in Gaza.

These findings do not mean every Israeli shares the same views. Palestinian citizens of Israel have demonstrated unprecedented electoral participation, and important disagreements exist within Jewish Israeli society.

But they do raise a difficult question for American lawmakers: How much of Israel’s treatment of Palestinians can credibly be attributed to Netanyahu alone?

The Election by the Numbers: A Country Divided, a Government Uncertain

Israelis voted on October 27 in the country’s first general election since October 7, 2023. Turnout reached approximately 77.7%, its highest level since 1999, with nearly 5.7 million ballots cast.

As of October 29, an election-results tracker reporting approximately 96% of ballots counted projected the following distribution in Israel’s 120-seat Knesset:

Netanyahu’s Likud remained the largest individual party, receiving approximately 20.6% of counted valid votes and a projected 27 seats. Eisenkot’s Yashar party followed with approximately 16.1% and 21 seats.

Neither bloc has enough seats to govern independently. Other reports based on earlier stages of the count placed Netanyahu’s bloc at 53 seats and Palestinian/Arab-led parties at 19, illustrating how projections continued to change as ballots were processed.

The absence of an outright majority means the next government will depend on coalition negotiations, possible cooperation across ideological lines, or another election.

One of the most consequential developments, however, has been the historic performance of Palestinian/Arab-led parties.

The Joint List and Ra’am together are projected to secure approximately 18–19 seats, potentially giving them unprecedented leverage in deciding who governs Israel.

Their success complicates any attempt to describe the election as a single verdict from a politically unified Israeli public.

Sources: Reuters, October 28 | October 29 election count | Times of Israel

Netanyahu’s Leading Challenger: A Different Leader, But a Different Future for Palestinians?

For Americans hoping that Netanyahu’s departure would fundamentally transform Israeli policy, the positions of his principal challenger deserve particular scrutiny.

Gadi Eisenkot, leader of the centrist Yashar party, is a former chief of staff of the Israeli military who served in Netanyahu’s wartime cabinet before resigning in 2024.

He has presented himself as a figure capable of restoring institutional responsibility, national unity, and political stability. He supports an independent investigation into the failures surrounding October 7, compulsory military service for ultra-Orthodox Jewish men, and measures to restrain violent settlers.

These are substantive differences from Netanyahu’s coalition.

But when it comes to Palestinian sovereignty, the distinctions become considerably narrower.

In August 2026, Eisenkot described continued belief in a two-state solution following October 7 as unrealistic, using the word “delusional.” During the campaign, he rejected the two-state framework and proposed arrangements involving limited Palestinian self-government under overriding Israeli security authority.

In an interview published shortly before the election, Eisenkot described the possibility of Palestinian autonomy or what he called a “state-minus.” Whatever the eventual arrangement, he insisted that Israel would retain overriding security control and that the Palestinian entity would have no army.

His settlement positions also reveal a significant difference between restraining particular settlement practices and ending the broader settlement enterprise.

Eisenkot has criticized unauthorized outposts, settler violence, and expansion into sensitive areas of the West Bank. But he has also expressed support for settlements that conform to Israeli-defined security interests and said he would not evacuate existing state-approved settlements in Area C.

His Gaza policy similarly leaves open the possibility of continued military operations. During the campaign, he pledged to eliminate Hamas’s governing and military capabilities within 18 months, through diplomatic arrangements or military force.

This does not make Eisenkot identical to Netanyahu. Their approaches to governance, coalition politics, settlement enforcement, and military decision-making differ.

But a government can reject Netanyahu’s leadership without rejecting Israel’s continued military domination of Palestinian territory.

That distinction is essential to understanding the election.

Sources: Associated Press, October 26 | Times of Israel, Eisenkot interview | Times of Israel, August 27

The Dahiya Doctrine: The Military Record Behind the Moderate Image

There is another dimension to Eisenkot’s political record that deserves considerably more attention in American discussions of Israel’s opposition.

In 2008, while serving as head of Israel’s Northern Command, Eisenkot publicly articulated what became known as the Dahiya Doctrine.

Named after the Dahiya district of Beirut, which suffered extensive destruction during Israel’s 2006 war with Hezbollah, the doctrine advocated overwhelming military force against areas from which attacks originated.

Eisenkot warned that Lebanese villages used for rocket launches would face destruction resembling what had occurred in Dahiya. He explicitly advocated disproportionate force and extensive physical damage.

He also described the strategy as an approved military plan rather than a hypothetical recommendation.

The implications are significant.

International humanitarian law requires distinction between civilians and combatants, prohibits indiscriminate attacks, and forbids attacks expected to inflict excessive civilian harm relative to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. The presence of armed fighters in a populated area does not automatically make the entire civilian area a lawful military target.

Eisenkot’s statements therefore raise important questions about how military planners understand proportionality, deterrence, and civilian protection.

Analysts and human rights organizations have examined the Dahiya Doctrine in relation to the Israeli military’s broader use of destructive force, including during earlier operations in Gaza. That historical connection does not establish that every subsequent Israeli military operation followed the doctrine or that Eisenkot bears responsibility for every operation conducted by other commanders.

But it does establish something essential about the man now positioned as Netanyahu’s leading challenger: his military record includes an explicit defense of disproportionate force and large-scale destruction as instruments of deterrence.

For American policymakers discussing an alternative Israeli leadership, that record cannot be treated as irrelevant.

Replacing Netanyahu with a former general does not, by itself, establish that the underlying military philosophy has changed.

Sources: Reuters, October 3, 2008 | Institute for National Security Studies, 2008 | Human Rights Watch, destruction of property in Gaza

And What About the Rest of the Opposition?

Eisenkot is not the only alternative to Netanyahu. The Bennett–Lapid Together alliance, Yair Golan’s Democrats, and Avigdor Liberman’s Yisrael Beiteinu also form part of the broader Jewish-led opposition.

But describing these parties collectively as a peace-oriented alternative would obscure substantial differences among them.

Former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, who leads Together alongside Yair Lapid, has long opposed Palestinian statehood and supported Israeli settlement expansion. Bennett has insisted that Israeli security operations must continue until Hamas is disarmed.

Lapid has previously advocated a two-state solution, including in a 2022 address to the United Nations, although his current alliance with Bennett has emphasized security priorities rather than an immediate path to Palestinian independence.

Yair Golan’s Democrats have adopted a more conciliatory position, supporting political separation and a negotiated regional arrangement. His party therefore represents an important distinction within the opposition, rather than evidence of a uniform rejection of Palestinian sovereignty.

Liberman, meanwhile, has advocated hard-line security policies and opposed territorial concessions.

The opposition is not ideologically identical. But opposition to Netanyahu should not be confused with a shared commitment to ending the occupation or recognizing a fully sovereign Palestinian state.

Indeed, reporting by Reuters ahead of the election found that a Bennett–Lapid government could pursue security policies toward Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran that substantially resembled those of Netanyahu’s government, notwithstanding important differences on domestic affairs.

The question, then, is not merely which Israeli politician appears more acceptable to Washington.

It is what changes each politician is actually prepared to make.

Sources: Reuters, April 27 | Institute for Middle East Understanding, 2026 Election Guide | Anadolu Agency, party-position analysis

Beyond the Ballot: What Israeli Public Opinion Reveals

Election results tell us which political parties voters chose. They do not necessarily reveal why each individual cast a ballot, nor can they establish what an entire population believes about Palestinian rights.

But surveys asking Israelis directly about Palestinian statehood, humanitarian assistance, and suffering in Gaza provide another important measure of the country’s political attitudes.

And the findings deserve serious attention.

64% of Jewish Israelis said peaceful two-state coexistence was not possible.

A Pew Research Center survey published in September 2026 found that just 16% of Jewish Israeli adults believed Israel and an independent Palestinian state could coexist peacefully. Nearly two-thirds, 64%, said peaceful coexistence was not possible.

Among Israeli adults overall, only 17% believed the two states could coexist peacefully.

These results represent a profound deterioration in confidence in a negotiated two-state future. In 2013, 50% of Israeli adults had expressed confidence that peaceful coexistence was possible.

Crucially, the question measured respondents’ expectations about feasibility, not whether they supported Palestinian independence in principle. Still, the scale of pessimism presents a substantial political obstacle to any future agreement.

64% of Jewish Israelis believed the United States was providing too much humanitarian aid to Gaza.

In another Pew survey published in September 2026, 64% of Jewish Israeli respondents said American humanitarian assistance to Palestinian civilians in Gaza was excessive.

Among Jewish Israelis who supported Netanyahu’s governing coalition, that figure rose to 76%.

But the finding was not confined to Netanyahu’s supporters.

Even among Jewish Israelis who did not support his coalition, 50% said the United States was providing too much humanitarian assistance to Gaza.

The generational figures were also striking: 74% of Jewish Israelis between the ages of 18 and 34 believed American humanitarian aid to Gaza was excessive.

Among Arab Israelis, by contrast, only 8% considered the assistance excessive, while 67% believed the United States was providing too little.

The contrast matters. It demonstrates both how attitudes toward Gaza extend beyond Netanyahu’s political base and how dramatically Jewish and Arab Israeli public opinion differs.

79% of Jewish Israelis reported being relatively untroubled by accounts of famine and suffering in Gaza.

An Israel Democracy Institute survey conducted in July 2025 asked respondents how personally troubled they were by reports of famine and suffering among Palestinians in Gaza.

Among Jewish Israelis, 79% reported being not so troubled or not troubled at all.

Among Arab Israelis, the pattern was reversed: 86% reported being somewhat or very troubled.

This was a measurement of respondents’ reported emotional reactions at a particular point in the war, not proof of support for unlawful conduct or a comprehensive measure of empathy. Nevertheless, the divergence between the two populations was pronounced.

78% of Jewish Israelis believed Israel was trying to avoid Palestinian suffering.

The same Israel Democracy Institute survey found that 78% of Jewish Israeli respondents believed their country’s military was making substantial efforts to avoid unnecessary Palestinian suffering, given the circumstances of the war.

Only 22.5% of Arab Israelis shared that assessment.

Conversely, 66.5% of Arab Israelis believed Israel could significantly reduce Palestinian suffering but chose not to.

The findings reveal two markedly different understandings of the same military campaign.

They also underscore why criticism of Netanyahu cannot automatically be equated with criticism of Israeli military conduct. Voters may reject his leadership for reasons having little to do with the treatment of Palestinian civilians.

Sources: Pew Research Center, September 2026 — peaceful coexistence | Pew Research Center — humanitarian assistance | Israel Democracy Institute, August 2025

The Palestinian Vote: A Historic Rejection of Political Marginalization

The election also produced a development that challenges any sweeping characterization of what the Israeli electorate wants.

Palestinian citizens of Israel participated in extraordinary numbers, helping propel Palestinian/Arab-led parties toward an unprecedented 18–19 Knesset seats.

The Joint List and Ra’am are not identical political organizations. They represent different ideological traditions, approaches to political participation, and strategies for securing Palestinian rights and community interests.

But together, their projected representation could be decisive in the struggle over Israel’s next government.

If the Jewish-led opposition were willing and able to secure their parliamentary support, it could potentially produce a majority capable of replacing Netanyahu.

Yet that possibility has exposed another contradiction in Israeli political life.

Leading opposition factions have resisted forming a government dependent on Palestinian/Arab-led parties. Their projected parliamentary strength has not automatically translated into equal acceptance as governing partners.

At the same time, Netanyahu’s Likud party alleged that Arab parties had engaged in widespread election fraud. Election authorities acknowledged investigations into specific suspected irregularities but reported no basis for claims that systematic fraud had compromised the election.

The accusations drew criticism from Palestinian political leaders, who warned that they threatened to delegitimize Arab voters precisely as their electoral influence was growing.

The historic turnout therefore tells two stories at once.

It demonstrates the political agency of Palestinian citizens who are using the electoral system to pursue representation and influence. And it reveals the barriers they continue to confront when their votes become decisive for government formation.

Palestinian voters are not an exception to the Israeli electorate. They are part of it. Their political participation must be included in any serious assessment of what the election reveals.

Sources: Reuters, October 29 | Carnegie Endowment, October 29 | Times of Israel, election results

Will Washington Finally Acknowledge That the Problem Goes Beyond Netanyahu?

For years, American politicians have drawn a convenient distinction between Netanyahu and the Israeli state, condemning the prime minister while continuing to defend the political and military institutions that carry out Israel’s policies toward Palestinians.

Israel’s election provides an opportunity to examine that distinction against the evidence.

Netanyahu’s principal challenger has rejected Palestinian statehood, advocated overriding Israeli security control, supported continued settlements under certain conditions, and defended a military doctrine associated with overwhelming, disproportionate force.

Other leading opposition figures have likewise opposed Palestinian sovereignty or maintained security policies that overlap substantially with those of the current government.

Public-opinion surveys reveal further challenges. Among Jewish Israelis, majorities have expressed deep pessimism about peaceful coexistence with a Palestinian state, while substantial shares have considered humanitarian assistance to Gaza excessive or expressed limited personal concern about reports of Palestinian suffering.

These findings are not a verdict on every Israeli, nor do they erase the important differences between parties and political constituencies. The historic Palestinian vote, in particular, demonstrates that there are organized communities within Israel demanding another political direction.

But the evidence does challenge the idea that opposition to Netanyahu necessarily signals opposition to the policies associated with his government.

Rejecting Netanyahu is not the same as rejecting the occupation. Criticizing his coalition is not the same as supporting Palestinian sovereignty. And changing the prime minister is not, in itself, a guarantee of change for Palestinians.

For Washington, these distinctions should matter.

American military assistance, diplomatic protection, and political engagement are not relationships with one prime minister alone. They support institutions and policies that can endure across successive governments.

The relevant questions for American lawmakers should therefore extend beyond personalities and coalition arrangements.

Will Israel’s next government recognize Palestinian self-determination? Will it end policies that facilitate settlement expansion and displacement? Will it uphold civilian protection and humanitarian access? Will Palestinians living under Israeli military control gain meaningful political rights and sovereignty?

And what conditions, if any, should Washington attach to its continued support if those policies remain unchanged?

The outcome of the election remains uncertain. Netanyahu may continue in office, Eisenkot may find a route to power, or coalition negotiations may produce another arrangement altogether.

But one reality is already apparent: the policy differences within Israel’s political establishment cannot be understood simply by dividing politicians into supporters and opponents of Netanyahu.

For American lawmakers, recognizing that distinction is a necessary starting point for evaluating what meaningful policy change would actually require.

The question is no longer simply whether Netanyahu stays or goes.

It is whether Washington is prepared to scrutinize the policies that persist beyond him.

Editor’s note: Election figures reflect preliminary counts available October 29, 2026, and may change. Survey results are identified by date and respondent population. Statements about military doctrine and political platforms are attributed to the documented records and positions of the individuals involved.